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ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Respondents, Lins Marketplace and Great American Insurance, ("Lins") have
rephrased and recharacterized Petitioner's, Gordon Shearer's, ("Shearer") Statement of
Issues to subtly result in a different set of issues that do not accurately reflect Shearer's
position on appeal. In reality, Lins is engaging in the logical fallacy of creating a strawman
just for the purpose of knocking it down.
This is particularly true in regards to Shearer's First Issue as to whether the
Respondent, Utah Labor Commission, made adequate, proper and complete Findings of Fact
which are supported by the record. Lins has rephrased that issue in terms that Shearer never
couched it in, in an attempt to cover the deficiencies in the two decisions at the Labor
Commission level. Nevertheless, the parties agree that the applicable standard of review is
that the agencies findings of fact will only be affirmed if they are "supported by substantial
evidence" Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
In regards to the second issue, i.e., whether the Labor Commission correctly applied
the statute to the facts, Lins again improperly characterizes Shearer's issue to obtain a
different result. The law of this State is overwhelming that issues involving the interpretation
and application of statutory provisions are governed by a "correction of error" standard and
that no deference to the agency's view of the law is required. Utah Administrative
Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1988). Esquivel v. Labor
Commission. 7 P.3d 780 (Utah 2000). Drake v. Industrial Commission. 939 P. 2d 177 (Utah
1997). Mor-Flo Industries v. Board of Review. 817 P.2d 328 (Utah 1991).
1

Lins mischaracterizes this issue as one of application of the facts to the law and then
asserts that the Commission's determination will be upheld unless the determination
"exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." In support, they cite McKesson v.
Lieberman, 202 UT App 10. [sic]. That case is actually McKesson v. Labor Commission,
41 P.3d 468 (Utah App. 2002) and it did not involve a case of application of the law to facts,
but rather one involving questions of law to be reviewed for correctness. Id. at 471.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Lins did not set forth an impartial and objective Statement of Facts which cite to the
record. That part of its Brief is highly argumentative and is actually more advocacy than a
statement of the uncontested and undeniable facts in this case. Lins has used the Statement
of Facts section as a pretext for the making of a legal argument. Shearer will respond and
dispel Lins5 mischaracteriztion of the facts as they apply to each of the arguments below.

SUMMARY OF REPLY

All of the parties agree that pursuant to the permanent total disability statute contained
in Utah Code Annotated §34A-2-413, Shearer has demonstrated that he is not gainfully
employed; that he has an impairment that limits his ability to do basic work activities and that
by reason of his work related injuries he is prevented from performing the essential functions
of his prior work. The sole issue on appeal is whether Shearer can "perform other work
reasonably available, taking into consideration his age, education, past work experience,

i

medical capacity, and residual functional capacity."
In this case, the Labor Commission abrogated its statutory duty to be an impartial fact
finder and rather assumed the role of an advocate for denying benefits to the injured worker.
The Labor Commissioner rejects the thoughtful and exhaustive findings of the
Administrative Law Judge, ignores all evidence in favor of the claim and selectively cites to
the record. The Commissioner's Findings of Fact are so erroneous, incomplete and
inaccurate as to be arbitrary and capricious. They are not supported by the record, are legally
insufficient and must be reversed.

ARGUMENT
I
THE WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT IS TO BE APPLIED
LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF AWARDING BENEFITS AND ALL
DOUBTS AS TO COVERAGE ARE TO BE RESOLVED IN
FAVOR OF THE INJURED WORKER,

Lins does not dispute the overwhelming established legal principle that workers'
compensation disability claims are to be liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits,
and any doubts raised from the evidence are to be resolved in favor of the claim. Utah
Courts have consistently reiterated this principle from 1919 to the present. McKesson Corp.
v. Labor Commission, 41 P.3d468,471 (Utah App. 2002) (quoting Ae Clevite, Inc. v. Labor
Commission. 996 P.2d 1072 (Utah App. 2000).

Lins merely argues that the "liberal

construction rules cannot relieve the applicant from the threshold requirement to demonstrate
all elements of his claim." (Respondents Brief at 16).

3

This is the first of many instances where Lins creates a strawman. Shearer does not
claim he is relieved from demonstrating all the elements of his claim, in fact, he
demonstrated all the elements by overwhelming evidence, which greatly exceeded his
obligation to make his case by a preponderance of evidence. Shearer's argument, with which
this Court has always agreed, is that the workers compensation statue must be "liberally
construed" and that "doubt must be resolved in favor of the injured worker."
Lins next argues that "[t]he fact that the commission's ultimate factual findings are
not as detailed as the ALJ's findings do not [sic] require the appellate court to disregard the
findings 'due to a conceptional flaw.'" (Respondent's Brief at 17). Once again, that was
never Shearer's argument. Shearer argued that the Commission's failure to make detailed
and comprehensive findings, its failure to weigh the conflicting medical opinions as to
Shearer's functional capacity and ability to return to any work, and the undue weight it gave
to a flawed vocational rehabilitation report, resulted in a flawed order. The "findings" and
"conclusions" do not evidence "humane and beneficent purposes" as required by law. The
entire Order should be disregarded due to that very basic and fundamental flaw.

II
THE FINDINGS OF THE RESPONDENT UTAH LABOR
COMMISSION IN DENYING SHEARER PERMANENT TOTAL
DISABILITY BENEFITS WERE ERRONEOUS, INCORRECT AND
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW,

A. A Transcript of the Second Hearing was not Required in This Case.
On October 20, 1999, a Hearing was held on Shearer's claim for workers
4

compensation permanent total disability compensation occasioned by his industrial injury of
June 23, 1995. (Rl at 157). The Hearing was tape-recorded, but apparently the first few
minutes of the tape were blank. The tape picked up with Shearer reviewing his work history
starting at age 10. That testimony was transcribed and is a part of the record. (R4).
Following the Hearing, the Administrative Law Judge entered Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order, dated June 10,2000, finding Shearer permanently and totally
disabled, as a result of his industrial accident and ordered the payment of appropriate
benefits. (Rl at 217-236).
Lins filed a Motion for Review with the Utah Labor Commission on February 25,
2000. (R2 at 242-256). The Motion for Review was granted by the Commission on June 30,
2000, who found that Shearer was not entitled to permanent, total disability benefits. (R2. at
281-284).
On July 19, 2000, Shearer filed a Request for Reconsideration with the Utah Labor
Commission, requesting in part, that this matter be remanded to the Administrative Law
Judge for the purpose of retaking Shearer's direct testimony, as part of it inadvertently was
not recorded. (R2 at 335-352). The Commission issued an Order of Remand on August 30,
2000 directing the retaking of the omitted testimony. (R2 at 413-414). A telephone
conference call was conducted on June 4, 2001 for the purpose of recording Shearer's
testimony. (R2 at 420-421). That testimony was never transcribed and thus was not available
to the Labor Commission. Nevertheless, on August 27, 2001 the Utah Labor Commission
entered an Order Denying Request for Reconsideration, apparently without the benefit of
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Shearer's testimony. (R2 at 427-432).
Lins now alleges that:
The second hearing in June of 2001 addressed matters that were not recorded
in the first hearing. In particular, the hearing centered around the claimant's
permanent total disability claim, which included, of course, discussion of the
underlying findings necessary to support a permanent total disability claim.
Given Petitioner's failure to obtain a hearing transcript and properly make it
part of the appellate record, this Court has no other choice but to assume the
accuracy of the Commission's factual findings. (Respondent's Brief at 19).
No citation to the record is offered by Lins for this remarkable allegation that the
retaking of Shearer's testimony on June 4, 2001 "addressed matters that were not recorded
in the first hearing." Actually, the record demonstrates otherwise. Lins, in its Memorandum
in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, strongly argued to the Labor
Commission that:
If, however, the commission concluded that it is necessary to re-establish the
record for proper review, the remand hearing should be expressly limited to
that portion of the hearing transcript which has been lost - Petitioner's direct
testimony of the events prior to October 20, 1999. No additional witness or
testimony should be admitted inasmuch as the limited purpose of the hearing
would be to re-establish the lost record. (R2 at 398).
In sharp contrast with its present position on appeal, before the Commission, Lins
stated that "The ALJ's findings accurately reflect the nature of Petitioner's testimony. The
Respondents have no basis for objecting to these findings." (R2 at 397).
The Labor Commission in its Order of Remand specifically provided as follows:
The Commission therefore finds it necessary to remand this matter to the ALJ
for the purpose of obtaining such omitted testimony. The ALJ will then
submit the complete record to the commission for final resolution of Mr.
Shearer's request for Reconsideration. (Emphasis added). (R2 at 413).

6

It appears from the record that there were not additional matters addressed in the June
2001 retaking of Shearer's testimony. Further, the I ,abor Commission specifically directed

J3e responsible to submit the "complete record" to the Commission.
Liiis is now engaging in a duplicitous argument. Before the Labor Commission it
argued that the record was complete, that die dispute was limited to Shearer's physical ability

Administrative Law Judge who heard that testimony made complete and detailed Findings
'

v<*huii > did not object Lins characterized the retaking of Shearer's testimony as an

the retaking of Shearer's testimony, despite the fact that it had directed its ow n
Administrative Law Judge to obtain one.
/vuin!-u . * -M^ iiiUi^aicu iiia', ;i accepted iu% i mumu^ /] i.K iv^^Kiirn; * .*L a,,v

substituted in their place, five general Findings of its own, most of which were in sharp
contrast to those found by the Administrative I aw Judge.

testimony as lacking credibility, being "self-serving" and "uncorroborated." (R2 at 436). A
remarkable conclusion given the fact that they now acknowledge that they did not even have
a transcr ipt of the testimony to revie w
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Lins can not have it both ways, nor can it take one position before the Labor
Commission and an entirely inconsistent position on appeal. Lins properly characterized the
retaking of Shearer's testimony as redundant and not necessary as to the issues before the
Commission and which are now before this Court. It is somewhat remarkable to argue that
a transcript of testimony must be provided to this Court, when that testimony was not before
the Labor Commission and could not have formed any part of its decision below, from which
this Petition for Review arises.

B. Shearer has Exhaustively Marshaled the Evidence in Challenging the Labor
Commission's Findings of Fact and Demonstrated that it is Inadequate to Support the
Commission's Decision Denying Shearer Permanent Total Disability Benefits.

Shearer acknowledges that it is his burden to marshal all the evidence supporting the
Findings and then demonstrate that the evidence is inadequate to sustain the Findings. Lins,
however, alleges that "Petitioner inadequately performs his marshaling duty", that the
marshaling is "flimsy" and "weak." Absolutely no support for that allegation is provided.
Shearer exhaustively and painstakingly went through the record and cited every piece of
evidence both supporting and detracting from each challenged finding. Lins does not cite
a single piece of evidence that Shearer failed to marshal. The allegation that Shearer did not
marshal the evidence can not be made in good faith and is nothing more than sophistry given
the total lack of any specifics or supporting evidence.
Lins5 allegation appears to be motivated by a guilty conscience, for it is the
Respondent, Utah Labor Commission, that made inadequate Findings, improperly

8

characterizing testimony il i^v cr heard, dismissing extremely persuasive evidence in support.
ofthe claim ;im1 o\ erlonkmr (lie 11IK>st plannf1 defects in flic r\ idmtv iigiimsf benefits I iiiiiir
verbally winces at the detailed and supported argument that it was the Labor Commission
which iiiadL nL.tn\ ami hiwisy" Findings and generalized Conclusions. In response it

recitation of the testimony, but merely only enough to reflect that the Commission fully
reviewed the matter. K-- -. icttablv ne reeoid i>. .. ^h^u demonstrates that the Labor
Commission

i^^ic^ me mattei. .a;..ci Ju n K\JC\* was highly selective and

inadequate.
in Nvrchn v. Industrial Commission. 800 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah App. 1990), cert.
'* i,iv».. r-«;• f .., - , ! I

i 1991), the Utah Court of appeals has previously informed the

' P

•rder for m ti, meaningfully review the findings of the commission, tlu
-iiust be 'sufficiently detailed ami include enough subsidiary facts u
- lose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factually issue \va-*
K'J * Action v. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Rucker
v. Dalton. 598 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1979))... [T]he failure of an agency to make
adequate findings of fact on material issues renders its findings 'arbitrary and
capricious' unless the evidence is 'clear, uncontroverted and capable of only
•iv conclusion.' Id. (Quoting Kinkella v. Baugh. 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah

. M.VM.UJ.;, Findings of Fact are ov\

&uc nuate \Miu» mey are supported b)r

"substantial r\'idrnrc" vii'^nlbv IIH nvoind ,is ;i w lioli Ml.ihl oik \iiiiin ^u\

lob li'nii liii'i

In applying the substantial evidence test, this Court must review the whole record including.
"not only the evidence supporting the board's factual findings, but also the evidence that

9

fairly detracts from the weight of the board's evidence." Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of
Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). (Emphasis added).

C. There was Inadequate Evidence to Support the Labor Commission's
Conclusion that Shearer Could Perform Other Work Reasonably Available and was
Therefore not Permanently Totally Disabled,

It is important to keep in mind that this is a claim for permanent, total disability
benefits. It is alleged that as a result of his work related injuries, Shearer can no longer work
and is thus entitled to appropriate benefits for such an injury. It is not disputed that Shearer
was injured in the "course and scope of his employment" with Lin's Marketplace. There is
no dispute that he has proved legal and medical causation for his injuries and that his work
related injury of June 23, 1995 was responsible for at least a 10% impairment of the whole
person. It is likewise not disputed that he was not able to engage in sustained work following
his injury and that he has not worked for any wages since January 5, 1996.
It is acknowledged by Lins that Shearer has met all but one of the requirements under
the permanent total disability statute. The only issue raised by Lins is whether Shearer can,
"perform other work reasonably available, taking into consideration [his] age, education, past
work experience, medical capacity, and residual functional capacity."

(Utah Code

Annotated, § 34A-2-413(1 )(c)(iv)).
In his original Brief, Shearer recited all the details of the industrial injury, all prior
jobs held by him, and all of his educational history, etc. Lins admits that the Commission,
in its Findings, did not provide such an exhaustive recitation of the evidence, but alleges that
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it "carefully rev icnvn 11 hi' niiilfri ' mull 'rifrd-impl*' •uppnil limn llu n v n n I in rendering its
findings of fact."1 (Respondent's Brief at 25). The record however demonstrates flint tins i; -i
just another loose assertion by Lins totally lacking any supporting evidence. This is apparent
-" • ••

. :••

:,.!. . nvi^ A n n o t a t e d , > J W * - i . - \ it*. •>

Age. T h e statute icquires that the '

•

u: ,

e

claimants age and lnm ihal impacts mi his abiln\ ti. work. 1 he xecord is clear that Shearer
'.' ,r hiiiii (in

.,

iK. AununiMrative L a w Judge properly found that

at the time o l the H. .:

,

Commission, however rejected that pure and indisputable fact and in its June 20 ?f

aoor
fM

lor

Granting Motion for Review found that he was still 68 years old, despite the lapse of a year.
(R 2 at 282)

0 • ;: i aii : thei ) = ai lat si • :)i:i August 2 7, 2 0 0 1 in its Order Denying

Reconsideration the Labor Commission n o w foi ind that Shearei vv as 67 j ears old (R 2 at 430)
w h e n he was undisputahh " 0 \ears of a$2t\
In its Bi ief, ] .i *. _.,,. ..!«..: - • r.tiaiy u > i -, \\\^ .iici "^ contention, the Commission did

allegation is correct. The Commission did m a k e a finding regarding Petitioner's ;ILV :
,KICI>>

ai

vir. tim.es got it wrong. This error is compounded ft> the fact that the Labor

Commission rrjecfni flir Nilmmislriilh i I ,n I . ., *

n - U l i niu: ,io io Shearer's age and

substituted an erroneous finding. It is not "mere! v *i typographical ei •••
h

~

l

m>* allegation it did not state Petitioner's a g e correctly even in the Order Granting
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This is not a mere error in calculation. Even if the Labor Commission had correctly
stated Shearer's age, it did not make any Finding as to the significance of that age on his
ability to work. The Commission instead goes on to reference Shearer's "good general
health" and refers to a surveillance video of dubious evidentiary value. The Commission
thus confuses and combines the separate elements of age and medical capacity.

It

erroneously states Shearer's age and does not make any finding as to the ability of a 70 year
old man (let alone even a 67 year old man) to "perform other work reasonably available."
Lins is quite correct that "Petitioner failed to reference any evidence which supported
the trial court's factual finding that given Petitioner's age, he could perform other work
reasonably available..." (Respondent's Brief at 26), because there was absolutely no evidence
to support that finding, not even as much as a scintilla. This is indicative of the problems and
defects in the Order below.
Shearer does however marshal the evidence that would dispute that assertion.
Shearer's unsuccessful attempts to find other work (exhaustively set out in Petitioner's Brief)
are indicative of the difficulties presented by his age alone. By any measure, Shearer has
satisfied this requirement and the Commissioner's Finding on this issue must be disregarded.
Education. In it's Order Granting Motion for Review, the Labor Commission found
that Shearer "is a high school graduate and has completed two years of accounting course
work at Stevens-Henager School of Business. He also took courses in solar technology at
Dixie College." (R2 at 282). In its Order Denying Reconsideration, the Commission
additionally found that "His educational history establishes his literacy and cognitive

12

iiLlidcs

ri

11'",'"' .ii -"I "id1! N lurther legal conclusion is drawn from that limited educational

Lins, however makes the astounding assertion that:
. there is no requirement that the commission recite the claimant's entin
educational history in making its factual finding. Indeed, the commission
referenced the relevant facts necessary to make a finding that the Petitioner
educational background make him a marketable candidal r - r M>K!- * r •
employment. (Respondent's Brief at 27).
Lins then goes on i<. mak* a patentlv false anil
'

;

his educatii
(Respondent*s

supported allegation Jia.

...ure to properlv n ^ , a j the evkjeiiix m regard to his ability 4o work, given
:

^ ;;
Brief ai ?T';. Nothing could be iurilici iroin ti±c uuih, although uiu

Commission cianns a need not recite Shearer's entire educational history, Shearer does set
il "ill in lull
The Hearing tesrirn-»* -eveals that Shearer graduated from !
years ago), attended i\\-.* • curs of business college between 1959 and 1961 ^JVCI 4* w-ai&
ago) and \nw, \ tai ai Dixit i oiiegc m 1% I, (ovei 20 years ago). (R6 at 7-8). He did not
graduatefrombusiness follq»c <iml Ins mtc ynti .n IV.u , *0 \r.ns ,i),»o, was sjniii sinii) mg
solar systems and alternate energy; virtually everything he learned in that field is now
o(^oi^;^. * ic i,u>> iu>i iiuvi ahs educational courses in the past 20 years, and has not used his
di eountinjj, skill" 11m (1M ^ <nk(nn.r uiu IVMI
rather significant facts.
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I In, i mnmission makes no note ui ihcse

The only Conclusion the Commission can draw from Shearer's limited and dated
education was to establish that he could read, write and think. No Finding or Conclusion that
his educational skills are such as to enable him, at 70 years of age, to find gainful
employment.
Any accounting skills which Shearer obtained 40 years ago, have long since lost their
currency. His relevant work history over the past 20 years has been of the manual variety.
He has not had any recent work history in which his educational background would be of
much benefit. In today's workforce, Shearer would be competing against recent high school
and college graduates with current skills. It strains credibility to claim that limited and
incomplete 40 year old education demonstrates an ability to find "remunerative employment"
in a modern workforce.
Past Work History: In it's Order Granting Motion for Review, the Commission
makes the following Finding of Fact:
Among other employment, Mr. Shearer worked as a supervisor in one
of J.C. Penney's accounting units and as a bookkeeper for several businesses
in Kamas, Utah. Latter, he was employed by the U.S. Forest Serv ice,
primarily as a resource assistant preparing permits for timber sales. After 13
years with the Forest Service, followed by relatively short periods of
employment in several varied positions, he worked as a cashier at Handy Mart
and as a cashier/stockier at Lin's.
(R2 at 282).
In it's Order Denying Reconsideration, the Commission makes only this additional
relevant Finding: "... his work history demonstrates an ability to function in a work
environment. It also shows significant expertise in accounting and the ability to follow
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policies .iiul iiih s " | \< J" ,il I Ml| I li.it r. Ilic client n! I k Lalin ( 'ommissioii s 1»Hidings on
this element.
In its Brief, the Commission acknowledges that it did not detail Shearer's full work
history IH*-:>

..i.ww... ;;ie present but tl,... *

r i d e van t to the material finding

Brief at 28) and when Shearer exhaustively cites the record marshaling each and every job
Shearer has ever held and the transferable skills he obtained thereby, 1 ins resort - to f ii now
vniiiMi ill .iiul inuedihk' alii ".i> ilnui lliiiiiiill1 ill i i III
(Respondent's Brief at 29). There is nothing Aims ^ • *

.UJC...,

, ...«: ....

.. . ^ u c n t c

*o« ^ r - -

\v>

the evidence on this i s s u e I.ins once again is unable to cite a single fact, no matter how
insignificant that Shearer failed to mat shal and in fact they acknowledge that Shearer
documented his "life time * oi

it: d '"

Contrary to Lins' absurd allegation, Shearer did show the error in the Commission's
factual findings regarding his ability to work given his past histor}

Although the Labor

I unifiiissioti"" I'lmlin^s, MINI

• "t, a n luuipiuii'is a u i n a n , H U T were also

completely incomplete and misLuu

ihe complete work history, as opposed U I In1

selective Commission summary, shows that Shearer's work history for the past 20 years has
btvii iiiii.iiHijillll1, in illli'i iiiiliiK nl lanitorial, ... stenance and cashier stockier,

\ t the time of

his injury, Shearer had worked for 7 r o n t o n ! a T in s Marketplace, His prior work experience was generally limited to maintenance and
• i lo. -ai ;,O-M-U i- • < K admittedly had worked for the forest service and had been in the
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Army, but there was no evidence that he had any transferable job skills from those jobs he
had worked twenty to forty years previously.
The statute requires that prior work history be reviewed to determine if the claimant
has any prior work skills that can now be applied in other work environments. All the
Commission found was that Shearer's work history showed a history of working.
In both of its Orders, the Labor Commission placed great weight on the reports of Mr.
Dirk Evertsen, a so called "rehabilitation specialist". Shearer marshaled all of the evidence
both supporting and undermining that evaluation and demonstrated that it was of little
evidentiary value.
Mr. Evertsen demonstrated his bias at the outset by revealing that in 33 years as a
vocational rehabilitation specialist he had never seen anyone he believed to be a valid
permanent total disability candidate. (R4, Hearing transcript at 116, lines 17-25 and page
117, lines 1-13.). The full marshaling and indictment of Mr. Evertsen's testimony is
contained in Petitioner's original Brief at pages 18-23 jmd will not be restated in full here.
Despite the Commissions conclusion that Mr. Evertsen had found several job opportunities
that were within Shearer's capabilities, the full record demonstrates that absolutely no weight
can be given to that opinion. Mr. Evertsen conceded that he had not been given all of
Shearer's medical records and then when provided with them at the Hearing he conceded that
he would have concerns about placing Petitioner in any of the jobs and that given his
limitations in the uncontroverted medical records there was not one job available for him
under the dictionary of occupational titles. He further testified that in order to get hired that
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it would be necessary for Shearer to not disclose his limitations or physical disabilities. He
would counsel Shearer to evade his prospective employer's questions, fail to folly answer
those questions and hide the true nature of his physical limitations. If he did not do this, Mr.
Evertsen testified that Shearer would not be able to find employment. Mr. Evertsen's
emphasis was merely on getting a job, even if it required dishonesty, but not on keeping a
job, since that would not be possible given Shearer's injuries and limitations which would
become very apparent in the job setting.
Medical Capacity: Although the statute references medical capacity and residual
functional capacity as separate elements to be considered, Lins tries to lump them together,
as though the clearly weak and meager evidence will somehow appear stronger when
combined. Shearer will continue to address them as separate elements, as mandated by the
statute.
Lins does not dispute Shearer has a significant impairment as a result of his 1995
industrial accident at Lin's Marketplace. (Rl at 232). He has been awarded Social Security
Disability benefits based on this work related injury. At the time of the Commission's Order
denying him benefits, he was over 70 years old and had not worked for wages for 5 years.
Other than quoting verbatim from the Commission's Orders, Lins makes no substantiative
response to the detailed marshaling of the evidence in Shearer's original brief.
Compelling evidence of Shearer's medical capacity is the testimony of his treating
doctors, all of whom advised him to cease working and seek disability benefits. (Rl. at 220,
223 and 234). The Administrative Law Judge made that specific Finding, but that significant
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evidence is not even referenced by the Commission.
Also unremarked and unrefuted are Shearer's attempts to return to work. Following
his 1995 work related injury, Shearer attempted to return to light duty work with his
employer, but aggravated his back and was again taken off work. (Rl at 219). He attempted
to work as a cashier, but even that light duty aggravated his low back pain and made it
impossible for him to work. (Rl at 220). His son attempted to make a job for him, one in
which he could lay down and even take a nap, but even with that accommodation he was
unable to work. (Rl at 224).
The Labor Commission dismisses Shearer's testimony as "self-serving" and
"uncorroborated" (R2 at 428), but does not offer any support for that accusation. In truth,
the Labor Commission did not even have a transcript of Shearer's June 4,2001 testimony so
its Finding or Conclusion on this issue carries no weight.
Although the Labor Commission placed great weight on the surveillance video, Lins,
in its brief only reiterates the conclusionary statements contained in the Commission's
Orders. There is no evidence that the Labor Commission actually watched the video, and it
appears it did nol. The Commissions characterization of the activity on the video parrots the
exact phraseology of Lins' Memorandum, with no mention of any specific event on the video
tape.
The Administrative Law Judge allowed the tape into evidence but characterized it as
"not accurately depicting a day in his life, or a week in his life" and further being "incredibly
boring". (R4 at 31, 34).
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Thus, the overwhelming medical evidence from the doctors was to the effect that Mr.
Shearer was incapable of working and needed to quit the workforce. It was his doctors who
encouraged him to apply for disability benefits due to his injuries. His unsuccessful return
to work efforts further showed that his medical condition was such that he could not work.
Finally, the surveillance video tape is of little evidentiary value, as it only showed limited
activity, which was followed by debilitating pain.
Residual Functional Capacity: The final consideration under the statute is that the
injured worker's residual functional capacity be considered. In this regard, Shearer had been
subject to two "functional capacity evaluations" (FCE).
The first was on January 16, 18, and 23, 1996, when Shearer was evaluated by
physical therapist, Virgil Beck. Mr. Beck concluded that Shearer could perform sedentary
work. (R5 at 34-45).
A second functional capacity evaluation was performed on May 14, 1999, at the
request of the insurance carrier, by physical therapist, Dell Felix who concluded that Shearer
could perform work of a "medium physical demand work level." (Rl).
None of the evaluations in this case measured activities over more than a full day, nor
was either evaluator able to see even the short term effects their "tests" had on Shearer.
The uncontroverted testimony at the Hearing was that the functional capacity evaluations
themselves greatly aggravated Shearer's medical condition, "putting him down" for several
weeks with the onset of low back pain. (Rl at 222).
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The Administrative Law Judge summed up the functional capacity evaluations by
noting:
Therefore, although the Petitioner may be able to do certain types of physical
activities on a 'good day,5 the evidence does not show that the Petitioner can
continue to perform work activities of even a sedentary nature on a consistent
basis. The functional capacity evaluations, although they measured the
Petitioner's physical capabilities over a short period of time, cannot accurately
reflect the Petitioner's ability to work on a consistent basis, i.e. eight hours a
day five days a week.
(Rl.at233).
In its initial Order Granting Motion for Review, the Commission found as follows:
"... his most recent functional capacity evaluation indicates he is capable of moderate
activity." (R2 at 282). No reference is made to Mr. Beck's evaluation, nor was there any
analysis of the two evaluations. In its Order Denying Reconsideration, the Commission cited
both reports and the surveillance video to find "...Mr. Shearer is physically capable of work
activities at least as strenuous as described in Mr. Beck's functional capacity evaluation."
(R2 at 429). The true nature of ones residual functional capacity is what one can do day in
and day out and not just in the artificial confines of a Functional Capacity Evaluator's officer.
Shearer's repeated unsuccessful return to work efforts show that he does not have
sufficient residual functional capacity to enter the work force.

Ill
THE LABOR COMMISSION INCORRECTLY APPLIED UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED §34A-2-423 AS IT APPLIES TO THE FACTS OF THIS
CASE.

The Utah Labor Commission had adopted Administrative Rule R612-1-10 dealing
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with the procedure to be applied to claims for permanent total disability compensation.
R612-1 -10(C)(2) provides that after a tentative preliminary finding of permanent total
disability, "an additional inquiry must be made into the applicant's ability to be reemployed
or rehabilitated, unless the parties waive such additional proceedings."
The Administrative Law Judge is to hold a Hearing to consider whether an Applicant
can be reemployed or rehabilitated. At this Hearing, the Employer or Insurance Carrier may
submit a reemployment plan. If after the second Hearing, the Administrative Law Judge
concludes that successful rehabilitation is not possible, then the Administrative Law Judge
is to enter an final order for continuing payment of permanent total disability compensation.
In this case, Lins' expert testified that Shearer would need vocational rehabilitation
assistance in order to access the labor market because of his disability. Specifically, Mr.
Evertsen, the vocational rehabilitation specialist noted that since Shearer has difficulty in
twisting, it would be appropriate for him to have competent vocational rehabilitation
counseling. (R4, Hearing transcript at page 136, lines 3-8) The Commission completely
ignored the uncontroverted evidence that if Shearer were to return to gainful employment,
we would require vocational rehabilitation assistance.
Shearer is simply asking for a tentative finding of permanent total disability so Lins
can begin it's rehabilitation process if it so desires. Shearer has satisfied all the requirements
to be entitled to a preliminary finding of permanent total disability and have his case move
to the vocational rehabilitation process to see if work can be reasonably made available to
him. As Lins' own expert acknowledges as Shearer is in need of vocational rehabilitation
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assistance, work is not reasonably available to him. To hold otherwise would totally
eviscerate Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-413(6)(a)(ii), as there would never be a need to provide
vocational rehabilitation assistance.
The failure to award Petitioner permanent total disability compensation or hold a
hearing to determine if he can be reemployed, violates state statue and the Labor
Commission's own Rule governing cases such as this.

CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT

Shearer respectfully requests that the final agency action in his case be reversed and
remanded with directions that Shearer be awarded permanent, total disability benefits as a
result of his industrial injury, or in the alternative that the case be remanded with directions
that the Commission enter a Tentative Finding of Permanent Total Disability and enable Lins
to proceed with a vocational rehabilitation plan, should they so desire.
DATED this 12th day of September, 2002.

Counsel4tfr Petitioned Gordon Shearer

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 12th day of September, 2002, a copy of the foregoing
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